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Reasonable Provocation
DISTINGUISHING THE VIGILANT FROM THE
VIGILANTE IN SELF-DEFENSE LAW
INTRODUCTION
The right of self-defense is “intended to preserve the
legal order by granting every person the right to fend off
unlawful attacks.”1 The state essentially grants an exception to
its usual monopoly on the use of force and allows an individual
to act as a “substitute policeman.”2 That right, however, is
subject to certain restrictions. Among those restrictions is the
requirement in most jurisdictions that the individual claiming
self-defense cannot have provoked the conflict.3 The precise
contours of what constitutes provocation vary by jurisdiction.4
Each jurisdiction, to some extent, leaves unanswered the
question of whether individuals can intentionally insert themselves
into situations where violence is reasonably foreseeable and still
maintain a claim of self-defense. The key problem in making these
determinations is distinguishing between vigilant community
members hoping to protect their communities and vigilantes
seeking to mete out their own brand of extrajudicial law
enforcement. While the former may be socially desirable, a society
of laws can have little tolerance for the latter. Defining the
boundary between these behaviors requires a carefully crafted rule
that “implements [society’s] collective sense of justice.”5
Perhaps the highest profile case to implicate these issues
in recent memory arose on February 26, 2012, when George
Zimmerman shot Trayvon Martin.6 Zimmerman maintained that
1

Mordechai Kremnitzer & Khalid Ghanayim, Proportionality and the
Aggressor’s Culpability in Self-Defense, 39 TULSA L. REV. 875, 899 (2004).
2
Id.
3
Margaret Raymond, Looking for Trouble: Framing and the Dignitary
Interest in the Law of Self-Defense, 71 OHIO ST. L.J. 287, 294 (2010).
4
Id. at 294-95.
5
Paul H. Robinson, Causing the Conditions of One’s Own Defense: A Study
in the Limits of Theory in Criminal Law Doctrine, 71 VA. L. REV. 1, 1 (1985).
6
Lizette Alvarez & Timothy Williams, Documents Tell Zimmerman’s Side in
Martin Case, N.Y. TIMES (June 21, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/22/us/
documents-tell-zimmermans-side-in-martin-shooting.html.
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he acted in self-defense,7 while critics claimed that race
motivated the shooting.8 The incident and the subsequent police
response sparked a heated national dialogue on race,9 gun
control,10 hoodies,11 and Florida’s “Stand Your Ground” law.12
Largely lost in the debate, however, was the question of
whether Zimmerman even had the right to assert self-defense
in the first place. Zimmerman said he followed a suspicious
character through a Florida neighborhood at night.13 In doing
so, did he provoke the subsequent altercation, thus barring him
from claiming self-defense?
Zimmerman’s questionable case of self-defense is hardly
unique. In Seattle, another individual is blurring the boundaries
between vigilant and vigilante. Phoenix Jones is the “selfproclaimed Seattle superhero.”14 For his nighttime crime-fighting
patrols, Jones wears a “skintight black-and-gold, belted costume,
a cape and a fedora.”15 In one incident, Jones stepped between two
7

Id.
Bianca Prieto, Trayvon Martin: “We Are Gathered Here Today to Demand
Justice” in Teen’s Fatal Shooting, ORLANDO SENTINEL (Mar. 14, 2012),
http://articles.orlandosentinel.com/2012-03-14/news/os-trayvon-martin-shooting-deathrally-20120314_1_shooting-death-bryant-chief-bill-lee.
9
Patrik Jonsson, Trayvon Martin Shooting: A Turning Point in Gun Rights
Debate?, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Apr. 19, 2012), http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/
Justice/2012/0419/Trayvon-Martin-shooting-a-turning-point-in-gun-rights-debate (“The
Feb. 26 shooting of the unarmed teenager in Sanford, Fla., by neighborhood watch
captain George Zimmerman, and the initial police decision not to charge Mr.
Zimmerman, sparked a national debate about race and violence in American society.”).
10
Id.
11
Gail Collins, More Guns, Fewer Hoodies, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 28, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/29/opinion/collins-more-guns-fewer-hoodies.html
(“The debate over the shooting death of Trayvon Martin seems to be devolving into an
argument about the right to wear hoodies, but it really does not appear to be a
promising development.”).
12
Toluse Olorunnipa, Stand Your Ground Law’s Impact Needs More Study,
Task Force Told, TAMPA BAY TIMES (Sept. 12, 2012), http://www.tampabay.com/news/
politics/stateroundup/stand-your-ground-laws-impact-needs-more-study-task-force-told/
1251191 (“Gov. Rick Scott commissioned the task force [to examine Florida’s ‘Stand
Your Ground’ law] in the wake of the February shooting death of Miami Gardens
teenager Trayvon Martin, which thrust the state’s controversial gun laws into a
national spotlight.”). Among other things, the “Stand Your Ground” law eliminated the
duty to retreat for any individual “who is attacked in any . . . place where he or she has
a right to be . . . .” FLA. STAT. § 776.013(3) (2011).
13
New Video, Audio Released of Zimmerman’s Account of Fatal Fight, CBS
MIAMI (June 21, 2012, 6:25 PM), http://miami.cbslocal.com/2012/06/21/prosecutorsrelease-video-of-zimmermans-account-of-fatal-fight/.
14
Casey McNerthney, Seattle Police Arrest “Superhero” Phoenix Jones in Assault
Investigation, SEATTLEPI.COM (Oct. 10, 2011, 11:39 AM), http://www.seattlepi.com/
local/article/Seattle-police-arrest-superhero-Phoenix-Jones-2210657.php.
15
Jessica Hopper & Neal Karlinsky, Real-Life Superhero Gets Nose Broken,
ABC NEWS (Jan. 11, 2010), http://abcnews.go.com/US/real-life-seattle-superhero-phoenixjones-suffers-broken/story?id=12589895#.UFstJ0K0Lww.
8
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men who looked like they were about to fight.16 At that point, both
men turned on Jones.17 According to Jones, one of the men had a
gun and “start[ed] swinging on me and start[ed] an altercation
with me.”18 Would the law of self-defense protect Jones if he
fought back? Or had Jones provoked the incident by intentionally
inserting himself into the middle of the altercation?
Controversial questions over the right to assert selfdefense are pervasive in the criminal law. In Pennsylvania,
Spencer Newcomer claimed self-defense after he stopped his car
and shot a man who had been following him after an earlier
argument.19 Newcomer claimed he thought the man was drawing
a gun, but had he provoked the incident by stopping his car in the
first place? In Massachusetts, Santano Dessin shot a man after
an argument that prosecutors contended Dessin provoked so he
could claim self-defense.20 Does aggressively confronting another
individual preclude a self-defense claim when the individual
responds aggressively to that confrontation? In North Carolina,
Roy Lowman’s wife shot a man who was beating her husband
with a metal pipe.21 The police said it was a clear case of selfdefense, but Lowman had initially confronted his attacker to stop
him from hitting the Lowmans’ car with the pipe.22 Can Lowman
claim self-defense after he inserted himself into a situation so
obviously fraught with the possibility of violence?
This note will argue that courts should apply a
reasonableness standard to questions of provocation in selfdefense cases. By replacing the confusing and contradictory
standards currently in place for determining provocation, a
reasonableness standard will offer a more coherent analysis,
which will enable jurors to reach just results that adequately
and fairly distinguish between the vigilant and the vigilante.
Part I of this note will provide an overview of the
various self-defense provocation exceptions in jurisdictions
across the country, focusing on three broad frameworks: Any
16

Id.
Id.
18
Id.
19
Rick Lee, Judge: Spencer Newcomer Can Argue Self-Defense at Murder
Trial, YORK DAILY REC. (Nov. 23, 2012, 11:34 PM), http://www.ydr.com/crime/ci_
22054704/judge-spencer-newcomer-can-argue-self-defense-at.
20
Jarret Bencks, Prosecutor: Somerville Shooting Set Up to Appear as SelfDefense, BOSTON.COM (Nov. 16, 2012, 2:35 PM), http://www.boston.com/yourtown/news/
somerville/2012/11/prosecutor_somerville_shooting.html.
21
Jessica Pickens, Sheriff: Man Shot in Self Defense, SHELBY STAR (Nov. 3,
2012), http://www.shelbystar.com/news/sheriff-man-shot-in-self-defense-1.43252.
22
Id.
17
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Provocation, Straight Provocation, and Provocation with
Intent. Part II will examine the particular circumstances
surrounding the incidents involving George Zimmerman and
Phoenix Jones and address how those circumstances and others
would fare under the various frameworks discussed in Part I.
Part III will propose a standard of reasonableness to apply in all
cases where an actor claiming self-defense may have provoked
the incident by intentionally inserting himself into a foreseeably
dangerous situation. Part IV will apply the reasonableness
standard to the cases of Zimmerman and Jones as a means of
illustrating the benefits and clarity of such a standard.
I.

THE PROVOCATION EXCEPTION TO SELF-DEFENSE
CLAIMS

There is wide support in both statutory and common
law for the proposition that individuals claiming self-defense
cannot have brought the conflict on themselves.23 In other
words, the actor cannot have provoked the incident. What
counts as provocation is significantly less clear. In common
usage, provoke means to “incite to anger or resentment,” to
“stir to action or feeling,” to “give rise; to bring about,” or to
“bring about deliberately; induce.”24 Black’s Law Dictionary
defines provocation as follows: “1. The act of inciting another to
do something, esp. to commit a crime. 2. Something (such as
words or actions) that affects a person’s reason and self-control,
esp. causing the person to commit a crime impulsively.”25
Beyond the dictionary definitions, different jurisdictions frame
the issue of provocation in different ways.
Provocation, as it is understood in the courts, exists on a
spectrum ranging from “any causal contribution”26 to provoking
a fight with a person “with [the] intent to cause bodily injury to
that person.”27 Yet this variation seems to be largely
unrecognized in the literature. Even general application
treatises intended for multiple jurisdictions tend to offer only
one definition of provocation, though that variation differs from
23

MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES, § 3.04 cmt. 4(b) (Official Draft 1985).
THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1419
(5th ed. 2011). Interestingly, only the fourth definition requires any intentionality for
provocation. This indicates that, at least in common usage, provocation does not have
to be deliberate.
25
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1346 (9th ed. 2009).
26
Robinson, supra note 5, at 4.
27
INDIANA PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS, Criminal Instruction No. 10.03A (2013).
24
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treatise to treatise and does not indicate that the standard may
vary by jurisdiction.28 While some sources recognize that
provocation does not have a single definition across all
jurisdictions,29 they fail to lay out a comprehensive picture of the
range of definitions available. This note rectifies that omission.
Generally, the ways that jurisdictions define
provocation can be divided into three broad categories: Any
Provocation, Straight Provocation, and Provocation with
Intent. These different frames are not mutually exclusive, and
behavior that falls within one frame may also fall within
another. It might be helpful to think of these three frames as
increasingly shrinking concentric circles within a Euler diagram.
The Any Provocation frame, for instance, incorporates all of the
behaviors addressed by subsequent frames. Each successive
frame then addresses a correspondingly narrower spectrum of
behavior. Each frame is discussed separately below.30
A.

Any Provocation

The first and most sweeping framing of the provocation
question requires the actor to be essentially blameless in the
instigation of a conflict before asserting a claim of self-defense.
In perhaps the clearest statement of this definitional frame,
the South Carolina pattern jury instructions call for a judge to
charge a jury that “the defendant must be without fault in
bringing on the difficulty” to claim self-defense.31 Washington,
D.C. goes further. There, “One who deliberately puts
himself/herself in a position where s/he has reason to believe
that his/her presence will provoke trouble cannot claim selfdefense.”32 In Washington, D.C., defendants claiming selfdefense must show not only that they did not instigate the
conflict, but also that they did not put themselves into a
28

See, e.g., 2 SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 10.4 (2d ed. 2012) (“One who is
not the aggressor in an encounter is justified in using a reasonable amount of force
against his adversary . . . .”); 22 C.J.S. CRIMINAL LAW § 60 (2013) (“A party invoking
self-defense must be without fault with regard to causing the altercation.”). These two
descriptions fit the Straight Provocation and Any Provocation frames, respectively.
Each frame will be discussed in turn below.
29
JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 226 (5th ed. 2009).
30
The descriptions of these frames will necessarily be limited to a broad
overview rather than an in-depth examination of any one frame.
31
South Carolina Jury Instructions Criminal § 6-6. Similarly, Virginia only
allows a defendant to claim self-defense where he or she was “without fault in
provoking or bringing on” the altercation. 2-52 Virginia Model Jury Instructions,
Criminal Instruction No. 52.500.
32
1-IX Criminal Jury Instructions for DC, Instruction § 9.504(a).
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position where they has reason to believe that another
individual would instigate a conflict. As the D.C. Circuit Court
has ruled, “before a person can avail himself of the plea of selfdefense against the charge of homicide, he must do everything
in his power, consistent with his safety, to avoid the danger
and avoid the necessity of taking life.”33 Under this frame,
simply having reason to believe that a conflict will result from
an action, even absent culpable behavior, is provocation.
The Any Provocation frame places a heavy burden on
individuals seeking to claim self-defense. Such individuals
must not do anything they know might lead to trouble, let alone
take affirmative steps to provoke the incident. Thus, provocation
can mean little more than being somewhere an individual has
reason to believe is the wrong place at the wrong time.34 While
the language courts have employed has been described as an
“overstatement,”35 various courts’ application of the language
indicates that it is still a remarkably broad standard.
In South Carolina, the courts have interpreted the
provocation limitation to mean that “[a]ny act of the accused in
violation of law and reasonably calculated to produce the
occasion amounts to bringing on the difficulty and bars [the]
right to assert self-defense . . . .”36 In State v. Slater, the
defendant, carrying a gun illegally, approached an ongoing
robbery in a parking lot.37 Slater testified that he approached
the commotion and surprised one of the robbers, who turned on
him with a gun.38 Slater said that he then ran away and fired
his gun behind him when he heard shots being fired at him.39
Slater left the scene and the victim died of the shots Slater
fired.40 The Supreme Court of South Carolina held that the trial
court properly denied Slater’s request for a jury instruction on
self-defense because he was not without fault in “bringing on
33

Laney v. United States, 294 F. 412, 414 (D.C. Cir. 1923). Though ninety
years old, this proposition still stands as good law. See, e.g., Young v. Scales, 873 A.2d
337, 343 (D.C. 2005); Sams v. United States, 721 A.2d 945, 953 (D.C. 1998) (“On
several occasions we have refused to depart from the principles set forth in Laney.”).
34
See, e.g., Howard v. United States, 656 A.2d 1106, 1111 (D.C. 1995) (“We
have repeatedly reaffirmed the principle that self-defense may not be claimed by one
who deliberately places himself [or herself] in a position where he [or she] has reason to
believe his or her presence . . . would provoke trouble.” (brackets in original) (quotation
marks omitted)).
35
DRESSLER, supra note 29, at 226.
36
State v. Bryant, 520 S.E.2d 319, 322 (S.C. 1999).
37
644 S.E.2d 50, 51 (S.C. 2007).
38
Id.
39
Id.
40
Id. at 51-52.
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the difficulty.”41 As the court explained, “In the instant case, the
record clearly reflects that Slater approached an altercation that
was already underway with a loaded weapon by his side. Such
activity could be reasonably calculated to bring the difficulty
that arose in this case.”42 In other words, the defendant could not
intentionally insert himself into a situation where violence was
reasonably likely to result and then claim that he acted in selfdefense when violence did result. Tellingly, nothing in the
court’s opinion would suggest a different result if Slater had
approached the robbery with the intent of aiding the individual
being robbed.43 In this case, the court found that Slater had
provoked the incident in question, even though he joined an
altercation that had already turned violent before his arrival.
In Scott v. Commonwealth, the Supreme Court of
Virginia held that a defendant could not claim self-defense,
even where the victim struck the first blow, if the defendant’s
actions brought on that blow.44 In Scott, the defendant, upset
that his friends had been arrested, confronted the town
policeman’s son.45 The defendant said that the policeman was a
“G d s o a b” as well as a “bootlegger and a gambler.”46 In
response, the policeman’s son “struck [the defendant] with steel
[knuckles] on the nose and [beat] him with the [knuckles] while
they were fighting upon the ground” until the defendant
stabbed and killed him.47 The court held that even though the
victim had initiated the physical altercation, the defendant still
could not claim self-defense under Virginia law because the
necessity for such a defense arose from the defendant’s own
actions.48 A defendant who provokes an incident, even verbally,
is precluded from asserting a valid claim of self-defense under
the Any Provocation frame.49

41

Id. at 52.
Id.
43
See generally Slater, 644 S.E.2d 50.
44
Scott v. Commonwealth, 129 S.E. 360, 362 (Va. 1925). Though dated, Scott is still
frequently cited in treatises on Virginia’s self-defense laws. See, e.g., 40 C.J.S. HOMICIDE § 189
(2012); Craig D. Johnston, VIRGINIA PRACTICE TRIAL HANDBOOK § 4:13 (2012 ed.).
45
Scott, 129 S.E. at 361.
46
Id. These insults are quoted from the court’s opinion. Presumably, Scott used
actual profanity rather than mere initialism while addressing the policeman’s son.
47
Id. at 361-62.
48
Id. at 362.
49
Id.
42
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Straight Provocation

Establishing a less-exacting standard than the Any
Provocation frame, jurisdictions applying the Straight
Provocation frame preclude the claim of self-defense where the
defendant acted as the aggressor in the conflict. For instance,
in federal courts, “[t]he law recognizes the right of a person
who is not the aggressor to stand his ground and use force to
defend himself or another.”50 Similarly, in Florida, the
defendant cannot claim self-defense if the jury finds that the
defendant “initially provoked the use of force against
[himself].”51 Arizona, Kansas, Maryland, Tennessee, and Texas
have likewise adopted the Straight Provocation frame.52
Notably, Straight Provocation includes a degree of
culpability that is not necessary under the Any Provocation
frame.53 As the Arizona Supreme Court held:
Before an act may cause forfeiture of the fundamental right of selfdefense it must be willingly and knowingly calculated to lead to conflict.
. . . [One] who merely does an act which affords an opportunity for
conflict is not thereby precluded from claiming self-defense.54

Thus, under the Straight Provocation frame, the mere
knowledge that one’s presence may provoke a conflict is not
enough to preclude a claim of self-defense.55 Instead, an
individual’s presence only counts as provocation if it is
50

1-8 MODERN FED. JURY INSTRUCTIONS—CRIMINAL § 8.08 (emphasis added).
FLA. STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CRIMINAL CASES § 3.6(f), available
at http://www.floridasupremecourt.org/jury_instructions/instructions.shtml.
52
See REVISED ARIZ. JURY INSTRUCTIONS (CRIMINAL) 3d § 4.04, available at
http://www.azbar.org/media/292098/2011_cumulative_supplement.pdf (“The threat or
use of physical force is not justified . . . [i]f the defendant provoked the other’s use of
unlawful force . . . .”); PATTERN INSTRUCTIONS FOR KANSAS CIV. 4TH § 52.250 (“A person
who initially provokes the use of force against [himself] is not permitted to use force to
defend [himself] . . . .”); MD. PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS—CRIMINAL § 5:07 (“You
have heard evidence that the defendant acted in self-defense. Self-defense is a complete
defense and you are required to find the defendant not guilty if . . . the defendant was
not the aggressor . . . .”); TENN. PATTERN INSTRUCTIONS CRIMINAL § 40.06, available at
http://www.tncrimlaw.com/TPI_Crim/40_06.htm (“The [threat] [use] of force against
another is not justified if the defendant provoked the [deceased’s] [alleged victim’s]
[use] [attempted use] of unlawful force . . . .” (brackets in original)); TEX. CRIMINAL
PATTERN JURY CHARGES—DEFENSES § B15.3 (“Therefore, in deciding whether the state
has proved that the defendant did not reasonably believe his use of deadly force was
necessary, you must not consider any failure of the defendant to retreat that might be
shown by the evidence if you find both—(1) the defendant did not provoke . . . the
person against whom the defendant used deadly force; and (2) the defendant was not
engaged in criminal activity at the time he used the deadly force.”).
53
See Robinson, supra note 5, at 6.
54
State v. Jackson, 382 P.2d 229, 232 (Ariz. 1963).
55
See id.
51
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“deliberately calculated to lead to further conflict.”56 This is the
difference between reasonable belief and intention. Under this
frame, individuals must intend to provoke a conflict before they
are precluded from claiming self-defense.57 Merely having reason
to believe that their actions will provoke conflict is not enough.
The Texas case, La Farn v. State,58 provides a clear
example of the application of the Straight Provocation frame.
In La Farn, the defendant and the victim engaged in an
altercation at a dance hall.59 The defendant followed the victim
outside and shot at him.60 The court held that firing the first
shot “forfeited [the] appellant’s right of self defense, and it
[was] of no moment as to whether the deceased was armed or
not at the time he was finally killed by the appellant’s third
bullet.”61 Even when the victim fired back, the defendant could
not claim self-defense because he had provoked the incident by
firing the first shot.62 This case illustrates the Straight
Provocation frame because the defendant here initially acted to
instigate the conflict. Even if, by the end of the encounter, the
defendant shot to save his own life, he started the gunfight.
Given this, the court held that the defendant had provoked the
incident and could not then claim to act in self-defense.
In Marquardt v. State, the Maryland Court of Special
Appeals applied the Straight Provocation frame to a
defendant’s attempt to claim self-defense for an assault charge.
In that case, the defendant broke into the victim’s home
searching for his wife, who was pregnant and who the
defendant believed was smoking crack.63 The defendant had
armed himself with a baseball bat before entering the home
because he believed “his wife may have been in the company of
violent individuals.”64 Upon the defendant breaking into the
victim’s apartment, the victim started running toward the
defendant with something in his hand.65 The defendant, not
56

Id.
The intent element under this frame should not be confused with the
Provocation with Intent frame, discussed below. Under Straight Provocation, the
required intention is merely to create conflict. Provocation with Intent requires a
greater showing. See infra, Part I.C.
58
La Farn v. State, 265 S.W.2d 816 (Tex. Crim. App. 1954).
59
Id. at 817.
60
Id.
61
Id. at 819.
62
Id.
63
Marquardt v. State, 882 A.2d 900, 909-10 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2005).
64
Id. at 927.
65
Id. at 910.
57
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wanting to “take a chance,” hit the victim in the head with the
bat.66 The court
acknowledge[d] that the privilege of self-defense is not necessarily
forfeited by arming one’s self in anticipation of an attack, but that right
is qualified by the proviso that the right only extends to one who was not
in any sense seeking an encounter. Here, appellant provoked the
encounter by breaking and entering into [the victim’s] apartment. The
circuit court did not err in refusing to instruct the jury on self-defense.67

Although the prospect of an armed, charging individual
seems to present a classic case in which self-defense can be
employed, the defendant forfeited any claim to self-defense by
breaking into the victim’s apartment. At that point, the
defendant had provoked the victim’s response and could not
subsequently claim self-defense. It is significant, however, that
the mere act of “arming one’s self in anticipation of an attack”68
does not give rise to provocation under the Straight
Provocation frame. Arguably, preparation for conflict could
preclude a claim of self-defense under the Any Provocation
frame because doing so would indicate that the person had
“reason to believe that his/her presence will provoke trouble.”69
Yet that belief is not enough under the Straight Provocation
frame. Under Straight Provocation, the defendant must have
exhibited actual misconduct by intending to provoke a conflict.70
C.

Provocation with Intent

The narrowest frame for precluding an individual from
claiming self-defense on provocation grounds is Provocation
with Intent. Unlike the Straight Provocation frame, where the
intent to provoke any confrontation eliminates the right to
claim self-defense,71 the defendant must intend to provoke the
victim for the purpose of doing serious harm under the
Provocation with Intent frame. The Delaware pattern jury
instructions articulate this frame by charging that a defendant
cannot assert self-defense where “the defendant, with the
purpose of causing death or serious physical injury, provoked

66
67
68
69
70
71

Id.
Id. at 927 (internal citations and quotations omitted).
Id.
1-IX CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR DC INSTRUCTION § 9.504(a).
See State v. Jackson, 382 P.2d 229, 232 (Ariz. 1963).
Id.
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the use of force in the same encounter.”72 In Pennsylvania, to
preclude the right to self-defense because the defendant
provoked the conflict, the prosecution must prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant provoked the incident
with the “conscious object to cause death or serious bodily
injury.”73 Pennsylvania juries are further charged that
“[c]onduct that is not of such a nature does not constitute the
kind of provocation upon which the Commonwealth may rely to
prove its case.”74 Thus, only defendants who act with the intent
of provoking a conflict meant to cause serious harm to the
victim are precluded from asserting self-defense in
Pennsylvania. These instructions are typical of jurisdictions
that apply the Provocation with Intent frame, including
Alaska, Hawaii, Kansas, and Kentucky.75
The Delaware case, White v. State,76 illustrates the
Provocation with Intent frame. In that case, the defendant
fired his gun at the victim after the victim had robbed the
defendant’s friend earlier in the day.77 It did not matter for selfdefense purposes if the victim later returned fire, because the
defendant had acted “with the purpose of causing death or
serious physical injury” in the same encounter.78 Firing a gun at

72

DEL. PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS CRIMINAL § 5.14, available at
http://courts.delaware.gov/superior/pattern/pattern_criminal_jury_rev_2012.pdf.
73
PA. SUGGESTED STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS (CRIMINAL) § 9.501.
74
Id.
75
See ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 11.81.330 (2006) (“A person is justified in using
nondeadly force upon another when and to the extent the person reasonably believes it
is necessary for self-defense against what the person reasonably believes to be the use
of unlawful force by the other person, unless . . . the person claiming self-defense
provoked the other’s conduct with intent to cause physical injury to the other . . . .”);
HAW. CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTION 7.01 (“The use of deadly force is not justifiable if the
defendant, with the intent of causing death or serious bodily injury, provoked the use of
force against himself/herself in the same encounter, or if the defendant knows that
he/she can avoid the necessity of using such force with complete safety by retreating.”);
PATTERN INSTRUCTIONS FOR KAN. CRIMINAL 4TH § 52.240 (“A person is not permitted to
provoke an attack on [himself] with the specific intention to use such attack as a
justification for inflicting bodily harm upon the person [he] provoked and then claim
self-defense as a justification for inflicting bodily harm upon the person [he]
provoked.”); 1-11 KY. JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 11.12 (“Provided, however, that if you
believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant provoked [the
victim] to use or attempt to use physical force upon him, and that he did so with the
intention of causing death or serious physical injury to [the victim], then the defense of
self-protection is not available to him . . . .”).
76
White v. State, 957 A.2d 2 (Del. 2008).
77
Id.
78
Id.
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another person clearly falls within the range of behavior
intended to cause death or serious injury.79
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Commonwealth v.
Samuel80 offers another telling application of the Provocation
with Intent frame. In this case, the limits of the frame are
highlighted by the court’s ruling on what falls outside those
limits. In Samuel, the court held that even behavior that is
provocative within the ordinary use of the word does not forfeit
a defendant’s right to claim self-defense so long as the
defendant did not provoke the incident “with the intent to
cause death or serious bodily injury.”81 In Samuel, the
defendant, in an effort to encourage the victim to leave an
apartment, brought a gun into the room where they were
sitting and placed it on the table.82 While acknowledging that
the display of the gun “could be seen as provocative,”83 the court
held that it did not constitute provocation for self-defense
purposes because there was “no suggestion that the [defendant]
had pointed the gun at the victim, that he had physically
assaulted the victim, that he had threatened the victim, or that
he had any physical contact with the victim.”84 Put differently,
the defendant had not manifested any “intent to cause death or
serious bodily injury.”85 The defendant, therefore, could still
claim self-defense when he shot the victim after the victim had
left the room and returned with a sawed-off shotgun.86 The
Samuel case underscores a key feature of the Provocation with
Intent frame—namely, that the court looks not only for
provocation, but for a specific kind of provocation. This marks
the crucial difference between the Straight Provocation and
Provocation with Intent frames. Absent the particular intent to do
serious harm to the victim, even behavior that would generally be
considered provocative does not preclude a defendant from

79

The similarities in the facts of this case and La Farn v. State, discussed
above, illustrate the non-exclusivity of the different frames. Here, behavior that falls
within the Provocation with Intent frame also falls within the Straight Provocation
frame, though the inverse is not necessarily true.
80
Commonwealth v. Samuel, 590 A.2d 1245 (Pa. 1991).
81
Id. at 1248.
82
Id.
83
Id. at 1249.
84
Id. at 1248.
85
Id.
86
Id. at 1249. This holding was further bolstered by the victim’s decision to
leave the room and return with a gun, which the court wrote shifted the balance
between the parties and placed the victim “in the position of being the aggressor.” Id.
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asserting a viable claim of self-defense under Provocation with
Intent.
The narrowness of the Provocation with Intent frame is
particularly clear when compared directly with the broader
frames adopted in other jurisdictions. In an Any Provocation
jurisdiction, merely being in a place where the individual has
reason to think a punch will be thrown is enough to constitute
provocation.87 In a Straight Provocation jurisdiction, the thrower
of the first punch cannot claim self-defense after the second
person hits back.88 In a Provocation with Intent jurisdiction, it is
not even necessarily provocation within the meaning of the law to
throw the first punch.89 Rather, the individual who throws that
punch must have had the “conscious object” of instigating an
altercation intended to cause the victim’s death or serious bodily
injury.90 Only in that exceptionally limited circumstance has the
defendant “provoked” the subsequent response and forfeited his
right to claim self-defense.
II.

FRAMES OF PROVOCATION IN PRACTICE

Having laid out a basic framework for how provocation
is defined across different jurisdictions, it will be instructive to
examine how those frames apply to fact patterns drawn from
current events. This application will illuminate the relative
strengths and weaknesses of each frame and highlight the need
for a new approach to the question of provocation.
A.

Case Studies—Underlying Facts
1. George Zimmerman

George Zimmerman’s shooting of Trayvon Martin
“sparked a national debate about race and violence in American
society.”91 Yet the facts remain clouded in controversy.
Zimmerman said that he acted only to defend himself against an
attack, while his critics claimed that he followed Martin and
fired the fatal shots because of Martin’s race.92 These two
87

See, e.g., Howard v. United States, 656 A.2d 1106, 1111 (D.C. 1995).
See, e.g., FLA. STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CRIMINAL CASES § 3.6(f).
89
See, e.g., PA. SUGGESTED STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS (CRIM.) § 9.501.
90
Id.
91
Jonsson, supra note 9.
92
In reality, this dichotomy may be a false one. See generally L. Song
Richardson & Phillip Atiba Goff, Self-Defense and the Suspicion Heuristic, 98 IOWA L.
REV. 293 (2012). Professors Richardson and Goff posit a “suspicion heuristic” to explain
88

1672

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 78:4

interpretations of events can be designated the “Z narrative”
(the account that Zimmerman gives) and the “M narrative” (the
account of Zimmerman’s critics).93 Ultimately, it is well beyond
the scope of this note to determine which narrative most
accurately describes that night’s events.94 For illustrative
purposes, however, this note will assume that the “Z narrative”
is true and take the statements George Zimmerman made as an
accurate account of that evening’s events. This assumption,
which should not be read to imply that the author knows or
believes this version of events to be true, is based on the fact
that Zimmerman’s narrative most effectively highlights the
central issue of this note: whether individuals can intentionally
insert themselves into situations where violence is a reasonably
foreseeable outcome and still maintain a claim of self-defense.
Zimmerman acted as a member of his community’s
neighborhood watch group.95 He lived in the Retreat at Twin
Lakes, a gated community in Sanford, Florida.96 According to
Zimmerman’s conversation with a 911 operator on the night of
the incident, there had been some break-ins in the

“how normal psychological processes that operate below the level of conscious
awareness can lead to systematic errors in judgments of criminality.” Id. at 295. As
they explain, “[w]hen the person being judged fits a criminal stereotype, the suspicion
heuristic can cause the actor more easily to believe honestly—but mistakenly—that the
person poses a threat and that deadly force is necessary and appropriate to repel it.”
Id. at 314-15. Thus, stereotypes regarding Martin’s race, age, and attire “could have
affected [Zimmerman’s] judgment that Martin posed a threat” even if Zimmerman did
not harbor overtly racist beliefs. Id. at 317.
93
David Kopel, Florida’s Self Defense Laws, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Mar.
27, 2012, 11:59 PM), http://www.volokh.com/2012/03/27/floridas-self-defense-laws/.
Kopel notes in his post that the debate over Florida’s “Stand Your Ground” is
ultimately misguided as it does not come into play in either narrative. In the “Z
narrative” Zimmerman did not have the opportunity to retreat in complete safety,
rendering whether he could stand his ground moot. Under the “M narrative”
Zimmerman committed criminal homicide and wouldn’t be able to claim self-defense
anyway. In neither narrative is the actual “Stand Your Ground” law implicated. Id.
94
Id. Given that a jury ultimately acquitted Zimmerman of second-degree
murder and manslaughter, there is some basis to conclude that his version of events is
at least plausible, regardless of whether it is true in every respect. See Lizette Alvarez
& Cara Buckley, Zimmerman is Acquitted in Killing of Trayvon Martin, N.Y. TIMES
(July 14, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/15/us/george-zimmerman-verdicttrayvon-martin.html (“In finding him not guilty of murder or manslaughter, the jury
agreed that Mr. Zimmerman could have been justified in shooting Mr. Martin because
he feared great bodily harm or death.”).
95
Campbell Robertson & John Schwartz, Shooting Focuses Attention on a
Program That Seeks to Avoid Guns, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 22, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/
2012/03/23/us/trayvon-martin-death-spotlights-neighborhood-watch-groups.html.
96
Prieto, supra note 8.
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neighborhood recently.97 Zimmerman called the police on the
evening of February 26, 2012, because he said he saw a
suspicious-looking teenager while driving to the grocery store.98
He told the 911 operator that he saw a “guy [who] looks like
he’s up to no good, or he’s on drugs or something. It’s raining
and he’s just walking around, looking about.”99 While giving the
operator directions to his location, Zimmerman saw the
“suspicious guy” start running.100 Zimmerman exited his car
and followed, until being told by the operator that “we don’t
need you to do that.”101 Zimmerman said that as he returned to
his car, Martin jumped out from the bushes and said, “[W]hat
the f**k is your problem homie?”102 Zimmerman said that
Martin then punched him in the face, causing him to fall to the
ground.103 Zimmerman described how the attack continued:
He was wailing on my head. When I started yelling for help, he
grabbed my head and started hitting my head. I tried to sit up and
yell for help and he grabbed my head and started hitting it into the
sidewalk. When he started doing that I slid into the grass so he’d
stop hitting my head and I was still yelling for help. And I could see
people looking and some guy yells out “I’m calling 911” and I said
“help me, help me, he’s killing me.”104

Zimmerman said that Martin covered his nose and
mouth and told him, “You’re going to die tonight.”105 Zimmerman
carried a gun that evening and said he thought Martin was
reaching for it.106 Before Martin could reach the gun, Zimmerman
pulled it out and shot Martin.107
Martin died from the wound.108 Zimmerman later said of
Martin, “I did not want to confront him.”109 On July 13, 2013, a jury
of six women acquitted Zimmerman of the second-degree murder
and manslaughter charges that had been brought against him.110
97

Transcript of George Zimmerman’s Call to the Police, MOTHER JONES,
available at http://www.motherjones.com/documents/326700-full-transcript-zimmerman
(last visited May 21, 2013) [hereinafter Zimmerman Transcript].
98
New Video, supra note 13.
99
Zimmerman Transcript, supra note 97.
100
Id.
101
Id.
102
New Video, supra note 13.
103
Id.
104
Id.
105
Alvarez & Williams, supra note 6.
106
Id.
107
Id.
108
See id.
109
Id.
110
Alvarez & Buckley, supra note 94.
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2. Phoenix Jones
Phoenix Jones is the alter ego of Benjamin Fodor, a
“self-style[d] superhero” in Seattle.111 Jones wears a superhero
costume and patrols the city streets seeking to stop crime.112 As
Jones describes himself, “I am just like everybody else. The
only difference is that I try to stop crime in my neighborhood
and everywhere else.”113
Jones does not stop crime by himself. He is a member of
the “Rain City Superhero Movement.”114 At least eight other
“superheroes” are also members of the group.115 Jones says that
everyone on his team has either a military or mixed martial
arts background.116 In addition, the Rain City Superheroes carry
“[t]asers, nightsticks, [and] pepper spray, but no firearms.”117
Jones also carries a net gun and a grappling hook.118 Freelance
filmmaker and photographer Ryan McNamee frequently patrols
along with the group and records their actions.119
Numerous videos of Jones in action are available
120
online. In one video, Jones runs toward a group of people he
believes to be fighting on a street.121 Jones scatters the group,
yelling, “Break it up!”122 Shortly thereafter, some of the women
in the group turn on Jones, and he has to avoid being hit by
them.123 In another video, Jones and other Rain City
Superheroes are “on patrol” when they witness a fight outside a
111

Jonathan Martin, Phoenix Jones Appears in Court; Vows to Keep Fighting
Crime, SEATTLE TIMES (Oct. 13, 2011, 9:19 AM), http://seattletimes.com/html/theblotter/
2016492053_phoenix_jones_appears_in_court.html.
112
Hopper & Karlinsky, supra note 15.
113
Martin, supra note 111.
114
Casey McNerthney, Police Alerted to “Superheroes” Patrolling Seattle,
SEATTLEPI.COM (Nov. 18, 2010, 10:00 PM), http://www.seattlepi.com/local/article/Policealerted-to-superheroes-patrolling-Seattle-821425.php.
115
Id.
116
Id.
117
Id.
118
Hopper & Karlinsky, supra note 15.
119
Ryan
McNamee,
About
Me,
RYAN
MCNAMEE
PRODUCTIONS,
http://mcnamee.weebly.com/about.html. Jones’s self-promotion has sometimes led to conflict
with other members of the Real Life Superhero community. See, e.g., Phoenix Jones Sells
Snake Oil, Calls It a Supersuit, URBAN AVENGER (July 9, 2012, 1:13 AM),
http://urbanavenger.reallifesuperheroes.org/2012/07/09/phoenix-jones-sells-snake-oil-calls-ita-supersuit/ (“The point is to make himself look good. [T]hat’s ALL that matters to him.”).
120
See, e.g., Phoenix Jones: First Fight of the New Year, YOUTUBE (Mar. 24,
2012), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QFmkyCmyMec; Phoenix Jones Stops Assault,
VIMEO, http://vimeo.com/30307440; Phoenix Jones: Getting Punched in Belltown,
YOUTUBE (Mar. 24, 2012), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TqFfHDSJ25s.
121
Phoenix Jones Stops Assault, supra note 120.
122
Id.
123
Id.

2013]

REASONABLE PROVOCATION

1675

bar and pursue the various attackers to help identify them for
the police.124 In a third video, Jones and a sidekick insert
themselves into the middle of an altercation in which one man
is aggressively yelling at and striking another man outside a
bar.125 But then the aggressor changes his focus and begins
punching and pushing Jones and his colleague.126 In all three of
these incidents, Jones or one of his cohorts calls 911 to request
a police presence at the scene. Jones is not depicted in any of
the videos initiating physical contact with the individuals.
Jones’s troubles continued in another incident in which
he claimed to be breaking up a fight. Despite his altruistic
motive, police arrested him after members of the group claimed
that a man in a “Spider-Man costume” attacked them with
pepper spray.127 Police said that the group was “dancing and
having a good time” before Jones arrived, while Jones
maintained that he broke up a violent encounter.128
The arrest highlights the complicated relationship
between Jones and the Seattle Police Department. On the one
hand, several of the online videos show Jones cooperating with
the police.129 On the other hand, law enforcement officials
profess skepticism toward Jones’s involvement.130 Seattle City
Attorney Peter Holmes described Jones as “no hero, just a
deeply misguided individual.”131 Officers have noted several
instances in which individuals have accused Jones of pepper
spraying them during “some type of disturbance.”132
Prosecutors ultimately decided not to pursue charges
against Jones after arresting him.133 According to City Attorney
Holmes, the city prosecutors did not think they could prove
124

Phoenix Jones: First Fight of the New Year, supra note 120. This activity,
with the notable difference that Jones and his colleague were wearing superhero
outfits, is essentially the same activity that George Zimmerman claims he engaged in
on the night he shot Trayvon Martin. See Alvarez & Williams, supra note 6. In both
instances, the men claimed that they were helping follow individuals they believed
were engaged in criminality to help the police locate and apprehend them. See id.
125
Phoenix Jones: Getting Punched in Belltown, supra note 120.
126
Id.
127
McNerthney, supra note 14.
128
Id.
129
See, e.g., Phoenix Jones: Getting Punched in Belltown, supra note 120;
Phoenix Jones: First Fight of the New Year, supra note 120.
130
Jenny Kuglin, Phoenix Jones: Real Life Superhero, KOMO NEWS (Nov. 19,
2010), http://capitolhill.komonews.com/content/phoenix-jones-real-life-superhero.
131
Martha Kang, No Charges Against Seattle’s Self-Appointed Superhero,
KOMO NEWS (Nov. 24, 2011), http://downtownseattle.komonews.com/news/people/
693190-no-charges-against-seattles-self-appointed-superhero.
132
McNerthney, supra note 14.
133
Kang, supra note 131.
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beyond a reasonable doubt that Jones intentionally pepper
sprayed the entire group, particularly because in the State of
Washington “a person is allowed to use force when he or she is
coming to the aid of another person believed to be in danger.”134
But Holmes drew a sharp distinction between the individuals
the law is meant to protect and Jones. As he phrased it: “Our
state’s good Samaritan statutes are designed to protect
individuals who happen upon—rather than actively seek out—
opportunities to render assistance to others, without expectation
of compensation. These laws are not designed to protect a
branded, costumed character, his roving video crew, or their
copyrighted videos . . . .”135
Seattle is not alone in its superhero presence. Real life
“superheroes” have arisen in cities across the country, including
Washington, D.C., Boston, San Francisco, Milwaukee, and
Minneapolis.136 As described in the New York Times:
In a niche of urban life that has evolved in recent years somewhere
between comic-book fantasy and the Boy Scout oath, a cadre of selfcast crusaders—some with capes, some without, all with something
to prove—are on the march.
. . . Whether they are making the world safer or just weirder remains
an open question.137

Whether these “superheroes”—and Jones in particular—
have the right to claim self-defense is also an open question.
3. Additional Cases
Difficult questions regarding provocation are not limited
to dramatic cases like Zimmerman and Jones. Thus, it is also
worth considering how those questions are addressed in other,
less high-profile circumstances.
In Pennsylvania, police charged Spencer Newcomer
with murder for shooting and killing David Wintermyer after

134

Id.
Id.
136
Mark Memmott, DC’s Guardian and Phoenix Jones: Real Life Superheroes
Open Up—A Bit, NPR (Mar. 14, 2011, 3:30 PM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwoway/2011/03/14/134539750/dcs-guardian-and-phoenix-jones-real-life-super-heroesopen-up-a-bit; Kirk Johnson, Crusaders Take Page, and Outfits, from Comics, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 26, 2011, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/
26/us/crusaders-take-page-and-outfits-from-comics.html.
137
Johnson, supra note 136.
135
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the two men argued outside their neighboring homes.138
Newcomer got in his car to drive away from the altercation, but
he stopped and approached Wintermyer after he saw Wintermyer
following him.139 Newcomer claimed he acted in self-defense when
he shot Wintermyer because he thought he saw Wintermyer
pulling a weapon out of his pocket.140 But the prosecution
“contended Newcomer provoked the incident by stopping
instead of driving away.”141 Further, the prosecution contended
that Wintermyer never reached for his pocket at all and that
Newcomer planned to confront Wintermyer that morning.142
In Massachusetts, Santano Dessin shot a man after an
argument that prosecutors contended Dessin provoked so that
he could claim self-defense.143 The prosecutor said that Dessin
armed himself with a handgun, a knife, and pepper spray
before aggressively confronting the other man.144 When the
victim apparently responded in kind, Dessin shot him.145
In North Carolina, Roy Lowman left his home to
confront a man who was smashing his car with a metal pipe.146
The man knew Lowman and his wife and had been a guest in
their home on the day of the incident, but after he left, he
started hitting the Lowmans’ car.147 When the man turned on
Lowman, Lowman’s wife shot him three times.148 The local
sheriff said that the shots were fired in self-defense.149

138

Rick Lee, Judge: Spencer Newcomer Can Argue Self-Defense at Murder
Trial, YORK DAILY REC. (Nov. 23, 2012), http://www.ydr.com/crime/ci_22054704/judgespencer-newcomer-can-argue-self-defense-at.
139
Id.
140
Id. The object turned out to be a cell phone. Id.
141
Id.
142
Rick Lee, Springettsbury Homicide: Witness Testifies about the Murder of
David Wintermyer, YORK DAILY REC. (Mar. 12, 2013), http://www.ydr.com/local/
ci_22766465/eyewitness-springettsbury-township-murder-testifies-court.
143
Jarret Bencks, Prosecutor: Somerville Shooting Set Up to Appear as SelfDefense, BOSTON.COM (Nov. 16, 2012), http://www.boston.com/yourtown/news/somerville/
2012/11/prosecutor_somerville_shooting.html.
144
Id.
145
Id.
146
Jessica Pickens, Sheriff: Man Shot in Self Defense, SHELBY STAR (Nov. 3, 2012,
7:20 PM), http://www.shelbystar.com/news/sheriff-man-shot-in-self-defense-1.43252.
147
Id.
148
Id.
149
Id. Technically, this case would fall into defense of another, rather than
self-defense because Mrs. Lowman shot to defend her husband rather than herself. The
distinction is relatively meaningless, however, given that the two doctrines are treated
essentially identically. See, e.g., 22 C.J.S. CRIMINAL LAW § 60 (2013) (“A person is
justified in the use of force against an aggressor to the extent it appears and one
reasonably believes that this conduct is necessary to defend oneself or another against
the aggressor’s imminent use of unlawful force.”) (emphasis added).
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Case Studies—Application of Frames
1. Zimmerman and Jones
a. Any Provocation Application

Neither George Zimmerman nor Phoenix Jones would
likely be able to assert self-defense in a jurisdiction applying the
Any Provocation frame of provocation. The jury instruction in
Washington, D.C., for example, that “[o]ne who deliberately puts
himself/herself in a position where s/he has reason to believe that
his/her presence will provoke trouble cannot claim self-defense”150 is
applicable to both individuals. They intentionally inserted
themselves into situations where their presence could reasonably
have provoked some sort of trouble, barring a claim to self-defense.
An altercation is a reasonably foreseeable result of
following a suspicious individual around a neighborhood late at
night. Certainly, Zimmerman did not do everything in his
power “to avoid the danger,”151 even crediting his version of that
night’s events. Avoiding the danger would have required him to
avoid even the possibility of an encounter with Martin,
assuming that Martin was, in fact, a suspicious individual.
Zimmerman’s failure to take reasonable precautions is
inconsistent with an individual who is not “even slightly at
fault in creating the difficulty.”152 Zimmerman’s behavior falls
short of the requirements for claiming self-defense under the
Any Provocation frame.
In Jones’s case, his disregard of the potential for conflict
is particularly stark. The reasonable possibility of violence
inherent in Jones’s encounters has been repeatedly
demonstrated.153 Yet, rather than do “everything in his
power . . . to avoid the danger,”154 Jones continues to thrust
himself directly into dangerous situations. In doing so, Jones
forfeits his right to claim he acted in self-defense under the
Any Provocation frame.

150

1-IX CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR DC INSTRUCTION § 9.504(a).
Laney v. United States, 294 F. 412, 414 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
152
Smith v. Commonwealth, 435 S.E.2d 414, 416 (Va. Ct. App. 1993) (citations
and internal quotation marks omitted).
153
See, e.g., Hopper & Karlinsky, supra note 15; Phoenix Jones: Getting
Punched in Belltown, supra note 120.
154
Laney, 294 F. at 414.
151
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A comparison to State v. Slater155 is particularly
instructive for both individuals. Similar to the defendant in
Slater, both Zimmerman and Jones approached individuals
they believed to be engaged in illegality.156 Indeed, Jones seeks
such encounters.157 Just as the court in Slater found that the
defendant’s behavior in approaching a criminal activity was
“reasonably calculated to produce the occasion”158 in which
violence occurred, so too would a court likely find in the cases
of Zimmerman and Jones. As such, both would be barred from
asserting self-defense under the Any Provocation frame.
b. Straight Provocation Application
Zimmerman and Jones would likely find more favor in a
jurisdiction applying Straight Provocation. Under this frame, an
act “must be willingly and knowingly calculated to lead to conflict”
before the actor forfeits the right to claim self-defense.159 Mere lack
of judgment, absent actual misconduct, is not enough.160 If a jury
believed Zimmerman’s account of the events of that night, he would
almost certainly be able to claim self-defense. Jones, on the other
hand, would require a case-by-case inquiry, though he would not be
categorically barred from asserting self-defense.
Assuming his version of events to be true, Zimmerman
would likely succeed in being able to assert a self-defense claim
under the Straight Provocation frame. It does not matter how
apparent it may seem in retrospect that following an allegedly
suspicious character through a neighborhood late at night may
lead to a violent confrontation. So long as Zimmerman did not
act with the purpose of bringing about the conflict, he would
not lose his right to claim self-defense. In fact, in Zimmerman’s
recounting of the events that night, Martin is the one who
threw the first punch and initiated the verbal and physical
altercation.161 Because Zimmerman did not intentionally bring
on this confrontation, nor initiate the violence in the encounter,
he did not forfeit his right to assert a self-defense claim in a
jurisdiction applying the Straight Provocation frame.
155

State v. Slater, 644 S.E.2d 50 (S.C. 2007). See supra note 37-43 and
accompanying text.
156
See Robertson & Schwartz, supra note 95; supra note 120.
157
See supra note 114.
158
Slater, 644 S.E.2d at 52 (quoting State v. Bryant, 520 S.E.2d 319, 322
(S.C. 1999)).
159
State v. Jackson, 382 P.2d 229, 232 (Ariz. 1963).
160
Id.
161
New Video, supra note 13.
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Jones is not categorically precluded from claiming selfdefense under the Straight Provocation frame. Jones certainly
runs afoul of the admonition from the Maryland Court of Special
Appeals that the right to claim self-defense “only extends to one
who was not in any sense seeking an encounter.”162 Yet, while
Jones does appear to seek out encounters, that does not
necessarily mean that he engaged in misconduct, as required
under this frame.163 The key inquiry for a court is whether Jones
acted as the aggressor in a given encounter.164 A jury would have
to make these factual determinations on a case-by-case basis.
Thus, Jones would have the right to claim self-defense where he
interposes himself between individuals who were already
fighting when one or both of those individuals turn their
aggression on him.165 He would not, however, have the right to
claim self-defense where he is the aggressor.166
c. Provocation with Intent
In jurisdictions applying the Provocation with Intent
frame, it is almost certain that courts would allow both
Zimmerman and Jones to assert self-defense. There is simply
nothing that could be gleaned from either of their actions to
indicate that they acted “with the purpose of causing death or
serious physical injury”167 by engaging in provocative behavior.
A telling comparison is reached by looking at the
Pennsylvania case Commonwealth v. Samuel.168 There, the
defendant engaged in provocative activity by placing a loaded
weapon on the table as a strong inducement for the victim to
leave the apartment.169 Despite being provocative, the
defendant did not lose his right to claim he acted in selfdefense because the action did not manifest the intent to cause
162

Marquardt v. State, 882 A.2d 900, 927 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2005).
Jackson, 382 P.2d at 232. The misconduct in Marquardt arose from the
defendant illegally breaking into the victim’s home. Marquardt, 882 A.2d at 909-10.
164
See 1-8 MODERN FED. JURY INSTRUCTIONS – CRIMINAL § 8.08.
165
See, e.g., Hopper & Karlinsky, supra note 15; Phoenix Jones: Getting
Punched in Belltown, supra note 120.
166
See McNerthney, supra note 14; see also supra note 164. The Jones case
highlights the difficulties of determining the aggressor in a given incident. Jones
claimed that he broke up an already-violent encounter. Id. Members of the group on
the street, however, claimed that they were merely “dancing and having a good time.”
Id. That the state ultimately decided not to press charges indicates the complexity of
making factual determinations in these types of situations.
167
DEL. PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS CRIMINAL § 5.14.
168
590 A.2d 1245 (Pa. 1991). See supra notes 80-86 and accompanying text.
169
Id. at 1248.
163
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death or serious bodily injury.170 For Zimmerman, even if a
court were to find that he acted provocatively by following Martin
while carrying a gun, there is no indication, at least in
Zimmerman’s version of events, that he acted with the intent to
harm Martin before the altercation began.171 Absent the element
of intent, it does not matter how provocative Zimmerman’s
behavior was or how reasonably likely it was to lead to a violent
confrontation. He could still assert a self-defense claim, which a
jury could decide to credit or not.
Jones’s appearance in the midst of a fraught encounter
in full superhero regalia, while likely to be provocative as the
word is commonly understood, is not provocation according to
the courts applying this frame.172 If such inherently threatening
behavior as displaying a firearm does not count as
provocation,173 then wearing a superhero mask surely would not
qualify. Given the breadth of provocative behavior that is allowed
without constituting provocation for the purposes of asserting a
self-defense claim under Provocation with Intent, it seems likely
that Zimmerman and Jones would be permitted to assert a claim
of self-defense in a jurisdiction applying that frame.
2. Additional Cases
a. Any Provocation Application
The Any Provocation frame is so narrow that it will
preclude a defendant from claiming self-defense in most
questionable cases. For instance, Spencer Newcomer—who got
out of his car and shot a man who had been following him after
their earlier argument174—would not be found “without fault in
provoking or bringing on” the altercation.175 Regardless of
whether the victim was actually pulling out a weapon when
Newcomer shot him, Newcomer could not assert self-defense
after putting himself “in a position where [he had] reason to
believe that [his] presence will provoke trouble.”176 Newcomer
stopped the car and went to confront the victim with whom he

170
171
172
173
174
175
176

Id.
See supra notes 91-109 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 71-90 and accompanying text.
See Commonwealth v. Samuel, 590 A.2d 1245 (Pa. 1991).
Lee, supra note 138.
2-52 VA. MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS—CRIMINAL INSTRUCTION 52.500.
1-IX CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR DC INSTRUCTION § 9.504(a).
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quarreled earlier.177 Clearly, this is a position that would give a
person reason to believe that trouble would ensue. Further,
Newcomer did not do “everything in his power, consistent with
his safety, to avoid the danger”178 given that he could have
simply continued driving rather than stopping his car and
confronting Wintermyer.
A nearly identical analysis applies to Roy Lowman, who
left his home to confront a man smashing his car with a metal
pipe.179 This was a circumstance where trouble was reasonably
foreseeable. Lowman, therefore, would likely be precluded from
claiming self-defense in a jurisdiction applying the Any
Provocation frame when trouble did result.
Santano Dessin, likewise, could not assert self-defense
in a jurisdiction applying the Any Provocation frame after he
allegedly armed himself and sought to confront his victim with
the intention of being able to shoot him.180 Even if Dessin was
not the first to turn the incident violent, his initiation of a
verbal confrontation can be enough to preclude a self-defense
claim under this frame.181
None of the individuals here would likely succeed in
being able to assert self-defense in an Any Provocation
jurisdiction. This highlights the wide breadth of provocation in
jurisdictions applying this frame.
b. Straight Provocation
A determination of whether an individual can assert
self-defense under the Straight Provocation frame turns on
finer-grained facts than a determination under the Any
Provocation frame. In the case of Newcomer, the determination
would hinge on how he behaved after getting out of his car. If
he acted as the aggressor in confronting Wintermyer, he would
not be able to claim self-defense. But if Wintermyer acted as
the aggressor, Newcomer’s right to assert self-defense would
remain intact.182
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Lee, supra note 138.
Laney v. United States, 294 F. 412, 414 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
179
Pickens, supra note 21.
180
Bencks, supra note 143.
181
See Scott v. Commonwealth, 129 S.E. 360, 361-62 (Va. 1925).
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Of course, “aggressor” and “aggressive” are malleable words that fail to
provide clear guidance. The inherent problem of applying this standard to facts such as
this is discussed more fully infra in Part III.A.2.
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Based on the reported facts in Lowman’s case, Mrs.
Lowman likely would be able to assert a valid defense of others
claim in a Straight Provocation jurisdiction. While her husband
went out to confront the victim, it does not appear that Mr.
Lowman started the actual altercation. Rather, the victim
attacked Mr. Lowman with the pipe. While Lowman may have
put himself in harm’s way by leaving his home, he did not
become the aggressor by doing so. Thus, a court would not deny
Lowman’s right to claim self-defense.
On the other hand, Dessin would likely be precluded from
asserting self-defense in a Straight Provocation jurisdiction. The
events reported by the prosecutor indicate that Dessin was the
instigator and aggressor of the altercation. Thus, he would be
squarely prohibited from asserting self-defense under the
Straight Provocation frame.
c. Provocation with Intent
Newcomer may or may not fall into this frame
depending on whether the jury believed his account or the
picture painted by prosecutors that he had planned the
confrontation.183 Like Dessin, if Newcomer set out that day with
the purpose of starting a confrontation meant to harm his
victim, he would be precluded from claiming self-defense under
the Provocation with Intent frame.
Lowman would likely not be precluded from asserting
self-defense under the Provocation with Intent frame, at least
as the facts in the case are known. There is no indication that
he acted with the purpose of provoking a conflict so that he and
his wife could inflict “death or serious physical injury” on the
victim.184 Additional facts could lead to a reassessment of that
conclusion, but absent such facts, Lowman would not be barred
from claiming self-defense under this frame.
Dessin, meanwhile, would provide a textbook case of an
individual precluded from asserting self-defense in a
Provocation with Intent jurisdiction.185 According to the
prosecutor, Dessin provoked the altercation with the victim
with the intent to “give him an opportunity to shoot [the
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See Lee, supra note 142.
DEL. PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS CRIMINAL § 5.14.
That Dessin also could not claim self-defense in a Straignt Provocation
jurisdiction once again illustrates the non-exclusivity of the different frames. See supra note 79.
184
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victim].”186 This would present a clear case of Provocation with
Intent, and Dessin would consequently be unable to assert a
claim of self-defense.
III.

A NEW STANDARD: REASONABLE PROVOCATION

Having examined the major frames of provocation in
self-defense cases and their application to particular facts, this
note now proposes a new standard for determining whether an
individual may claim to have acted in self-defense without
having provoked the incident: reasonableness. This new
standard will address the shortcomings of the other approaches
and provide a workable, consistent frame for determining
provocation in self-defense cases.
As discussed below, each of the existing frames for
analyzing provocation holds some flaw in its application. Thus,
a new rule is needed to best articulate and promote society’s
“collective sense of justice.”187 The challenge in crafting such a
rule is to find the appropriate balance between the vigilant and
the vigilante. The answer lies in reasonableness. By focusing
the relevant inquiry less on who contributed to the altercation,
the meaning of provocation, or the intent of various actors, the
courts will be able to better achieve results consistent with
society’s notions of justice.
A.

Weaknesses in the Frameworks

In addition to the problematic inconsistencies between
the frames discussed above, each frame falls short of providing
an optimal rule for determining questions of provocation in
self-defense cases. As such, they fail to achieve the goals of the
criminal law in general: “to create the set of rules that best
implements our collective sense of justice.”188 Thus, in crafting a
rule to govern claims of self-defense, the focus should be both
on achieving justice in the actual case as well as incentivizing
behavior that society wishes to promote. In delineating the
boundaries of self-defense, this means crafting a rule to
encourage intervention in the killing of Kitty Genovese,189 while
186

Bencks, supra note 143.
Robinson, supra note 5, at 1.
188
Id.
189
“In 1964, a young woman named Kitty Genovese was murdered in Queens,
NY by repeated stabbings over a period of 30 minutes while 38 witnesses watched from
their buildings—none of whom called the police.” Carolyn D. Amadon, Thoughts from
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also discouraging someone from enacting a Death Wish
scenario.190 For the reasons discussed below, each of the current
frames falls short of meeting this ideal.
1. Any Provocation
The primary flaw with the Any Provocation frame is
that it shifts too much of the burden of good behavior onto the
actor claiming to have acted in self-defense. Not only must
actors show that they did not provoke the incident within the
plain meaning of the word, they must also show that they are
“without fault in bringing on the difficulty.”191 Looking solely at
that language, and absent any limiting instructions on what it
means to be without fault, that frame could encompass
behavior as innocent as painting one’s house a color that one
has reason to know will upset his neighbor.192 While there do
not seem to be any cases of such innocent behavior precluding
the right to claim self-defense, the jury instructions in
Washington, D.C. would preclude a self-defense claim even
where one does nothing more than enter into a situation
wherein he has reason to believe that trouble will result.193 This
essentially would allow the most aggressive members of society
to prevent others from engaging in what would otherwise be
lawful and protected conduct.194 Certainly, it is not within our
“collective sense of justice”195 to allow the aggressive and violent
to determine the conduct of everyone else. To do so would be to
undermine the very principles underlying our system of laws.
Because the Any Provocation frame comes too close to the line
of allowing the most irrational or threatening individuals to

the Chair: No Excuses, CBA REC., Oct. 2005, at 52. “The witnesses, who watched a man
attack and kill Kitty Genovese from their windows, stated they feared potential
criminal liability if a court later determined that they wrongfully interfered by coming
to her aid.” Alicia M. Duff, Rhode Island Adopts Model Penal Code Standard for the
Use of Force for the Protection of Others—State v. Beeley, 653 A.2d 722 (R.I. 1995), 30
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 551, 553 n.16 (1997).
190
“Five [Death Wish] films were produced between 1974 and 1994. All of
them starred Charles Bronson as Paul Kersey, a previously pacifistic architect-turnedvigilante due to the death of his wife at the hands of criminals.” Robert J. Cottrol,
Submission Is Not the Answer: Lethal Violence, Microcultures of Criminal Violence and
the Right to Self-Defense, 69 U. COLO. L. REV. 1029, 1030 n.3 (1998).
191
S.C. REQUESTS TO CHARGE – CRIMINAL § 6-6.
192
Robinson, supra note 5, at 5-6.
193
1-IX CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR DC INSTRUCTION § 9.504(a).
194
See Raymond, supra note 3, at 338.
195
Robinson, supra note 5, at 1.
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determine the behavior of all others, it cannot be accepted as a
workable principle as it is currently formulated.
2. Straight Provocation
The Straight Provocation frame exists as a kind of
middle ground between the extremes of the Any Provocation
and Provocation with Intent frames. It comes the closest to
exemplifying the plain meaning of provocation because that
meaning is exactly the standard that the frame uses. One who
provokes an incident cannot claim self-defense.196 While the
frame is admirably straightforward, its application lacks
clarity absent some explanatory gloss. Certainly there are
obvious cases where the defendant would not have the right to
assert self-defense—for example, where the defendant fires the
first shot197 or breaks into the victim’s home.198 But there is a
vast middle ground of behavior that is not so clearly delineated.
What about the use of insulting language?199 What about
brandishing a firearm without making an overt threat?200 This
is to say nothing of the potentially provocative behavior of
George Zimmerman or Phoenix Jones. In these gray areas, the
mere word “provocation” offers little guidance. While the
Straight Provocation frame comes closest to offering a
Goldilocks “just right” solution to the self-defense framing
question, it can only be useful and beneficial in application
when it is paired with some explanation to further elaborate
what is meant. Absent that explanation, the frame is too vague
to serve as an appropriate analytic tool.
3. Provocation with Intent
Where the Any Provocation frame overly restricts the
behavior of an individual seeking to claim self-defense, the
Provocation with Intent frame allows too much latitude. Under
this frame, an individual can engage in foreseeably and
196

See FLA. STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTION (CRIMINAL) § 3.6(f) (2012), available at
http://www.floridasupremecourt.org/jury_instructions/chapters/chapter3/p1c3s3.6.f.rtf.
197
See La Farn v. State, 265 S.W.2d 816, 816-17 (Tex. Crim. App. 1954).
198
See Marquardt v. State, 882 A.2d 900, 908-10 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2005).
199
See Scott v. Commonwealth, 129 S.E. 360, 361-62 (Va. 1925) (applying the
Any Provocation frame to hold that defendant’s insulting language qualified as
provocation).
200
See Commonwealth v. Samuel, 590 A.2d 1245, 1246-47 (Pa. 1991)
(applying the Provocation with Intent frame to hold that displaying weapon did not
qualify as provocation).
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deliberately provocative behavior so long as it is not with the
“conscious object to cause death or serious bodily injury to the
alleged victim.”201 As discussed above, under this frame, it is
possible for an individual to throw the first punch in a fight
and then still claim self-defense when the victim responds
violently. This frame defies the plain meaning of the word
“provocation” and allows behavior fundamentally at odds with
society’s notions of justice: namely, that a person can start a
fight and then claim legal protection when the other party
fights back.202 This sort of behavior is exactly the conduct that
the provocation doctrine is designed to prevent. This frame’s
failure to prevent that conduct places its flaws in sharp relief.
B.

Reasonable Provocation

To correct for the problems inherent in the existing
frames of provocation, this note contends that states should adopt
a rule whereby courts consider a two-part inquiry when weighing
whether a defendant is precluded from claiming self-defense:
(1) Were the defendant’s allegedly provocative actions
objectively reasonable?
(2) Was the risk of violence that the defendant incurred
reasonable in light of the totality of circumstances?
Focusing on the reasonableness of the defendant’s
actions and asking whether the defendant has engaged in
unjustifiably risky behavior ensures that determinations
regarding self-defense and provocation closely conform to
society’s sense of justice. That sense would become the
determinative inquiry. This ensures that legal judgments
surrounding provocation in self-defense cases abide by societal
norms for context-specific situations rather than the variable
judicially-imposed frames discussed above. Indeed, reasonableness
is a “device for delivering to the jury, in its role as conscience of the

201

PA. SUGGESTED STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS (CRIM.) § 9.501 (2012).
Much of the criticism of the verdict in the Zimmerman case seems to stem
from the belief that Zimmerman initiated the confrontation with Martin but did not
suffer any legal consequence as a result. See e.g., Amy Dardashtian, Zimmerman
Verdict Exposes Deficiencies in U.S. Self-Defense Law, HUFFINGTON POST (July 14,
2013, 2:52 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/amy-dardashtian/zimmerman-trialself-defense-law_b_3594741.html (“Those who believe Zimmerman should have been
found guilty, overwhelmingly point to the fact that he was the aggressor.”).
Dardashtian argues that the law in this area of self-defense is improperly divorced
from morality because it allows the instigator in certain altercations to avoid
punishment. Id.
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community, the normative or value judgment as to the degree of
moral culpability to be assigned to the particular offender.”203
The first prong of the test focuses on the specific actions
of the defendant to determine whether the individual acted in
an objectively reasonable manner. In other words, did the
individual act as “a reasonable person of ordinary prudence
would have done in the same or similar circumstances”?204 It
does not make sense, nor does it comport with conceptions of
justice, to entitle an individual acting unreasonably in
provoking an encounter to then claim immunity from
prosecution. Likewise, it does not follow that someone who does
act reasonably should be precluded from claiming self-defense
because of the unreasonable actions of others.
Framing the issue as one of reasonableness inherently
strikes a balance between these two poles and ensures that
only those individuals conforming to baseline societal norms
can claim legal justification when they commit what would
otherwise be a crime. Thus, because he was not acting
reasonably, the vigilante killer of Death Wish205 who actively
pursues criminals to seek revenge would be precluded, as a
threshold matter, from claiming self-defense in any situation
where those criminals turned on him. Society has no interest in
protecting the vigilante. The initial shooters in La Farn206 and
White207 would be similarly barred. In contrast, the provocative
house painter of Professor Robinson’s hypothetical208 would not
be precluded from claiming self-defense absent some
extraordinary set of circumstances.
The first prong of the test looks entirely at the facial
reasonableness of the allegedly provocative actions. It calls for
a very tight focus on whether the “provocative” action itself—be
it following a suspicious character at night or jumping between
two men about to fight—is, on its face, reasonable. This prong
203

Kevin Jon Heller, Beyond the Reasonable Man? A Sympathetic but Critical
Assessment of the Use of Subjective Standards of Reasonableness in Self-Defense and
Provocation Cases, 26 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1, 16 (1998) (quoting Dolores A. Donovan &
Stephanie M. Wildman, Is the Reasonable Man Obsolete: A Critical Perspective on SelfDefense and Provocation, 14 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 435, 444-46 (1981)).
204
57A AM. JUR. 2d NEGLIGENCE § 133 (discussing the reasonable person
standard in the context of negligence).
205
See supra note 190.
206
La Farn v. State, 265 S.W.2d 816, 817 (Tex. Crim. App. 1954); see
discussion supra notes 58-62 and accompanying text.
207
White v. State, No. 329, 2008 WL 4107980, at *1 (Del. Sept. 5, 2008); see
discussion supra notes 76-78 and accompanying text.
208
See Robinson, supra note 5, at 5-6.
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calls for looking at the act itself, devoid of context. Actions that
are objectively reasonable on their face are presumed not to be
provocation under this frame. Those actions that are not
reasonable are presumed to be provocation.
The first prong, however, is not necessarily dispositive.
Rather, it creates a rebuttable presumption that is then
analyzed under the second prong. This two-step process is
necessary because in some instances it may be desirable to
endorse and encourage behavior that is facially unreasonable.
Likewise, actions that seem reasonable out of context may be
unreasonable when considering them in their full context.
Thus, under the second prong of the test, a jury would consider
the totality of circumstances in which the defendant acted. This
triggers a balancing test. If the jury finds that a facially
unreasonable action was the preferred course of conduct in
light of the totality of circumstances, the action would not be
considered provocation. Similarly, a facially reasonable action
can be deemed provocation if the broader context suggests
unreasonableness, though this may be a more difficult
threshold to overcome. In either instance, the facial
reasonableness of the actions creates a presumption that can
be confirmed or rebutted in light of the totality of
circumstances. A defendant able to comply with these two
prongs would be entitled to claim self-defense.
The Kitty Genovese case209 provides a clear example of
the role the second prong plays in the proposed test. While it
may generally appear unreasonable to insert oneself into a
situation where a deranged man is repeatedly stabbing a
woman on the street, it would be even worse to consciously
ignore the murder. In that circumstance, a facially
unreasonable action—confronting a disturbed man wielding a
knife—is the proper and socially desirable course of conduct,
and the would-be Samaritan runs a risk of violence that is
more than justified by the apparent harm that will result from
a lack of intervention. 210 Any legal rule that did not account for
209

See Amadon, supra note 189.
The Kitty Genovese example may be slightly misleading here because
many jurisdictions recognize defense of others alongside self-defense as a justification
for otherwise criminal behavior. See, e.g., 22 C.J.S. CRIMINAL LAW § 60 (2012) (“A
person is justified in the use of force against an aggressor to the extent it appears and
one reasonably believes that this conduct is necessary to defend oneself or another
against the aggressor’s imminent use of unlawful force.” (emphasis added)). Thus, a
case like Kitty Genovese is already covered by existing law. What is not addressed is a
situation where an individual intervenes for the good of the general community but
cannot point to a specific individual in need of the intervention. The actions of
210
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such behavior would not be in accord with the conceptions of
justice that the criminal law is designed to preserve. The
criminal law ought to protect the vigilant community member
who aids his community and fellow community members.
While it does not appear that any jurisdiction has yet
introduced reasonableness as the central inquiry for
determining a question of provocation, reasonableness is deeply
intertwined with many other aspects of a self-defense claim.
For instance, in New York, where a defendant claims to have
acted in self-defense, the jury must determine whether “he
believed deadly force was necessary to avert the imminent use
of deadly force” and also “whether these beliefs were
reasonable.”211 Similarly, in the Sixth Circuit, a defendant
acting in self-defense may use “only as much force as
reasonably appears to be necessary under the circumstances.”212
In some states, a defendant who acted “reasonably in selfdefense is generally insulated from criminal liability even if the
person injured is an innocent bystander.”213 In short,
determining questions of reasonableness with regard to
provocation would be consistent with the decisions juries
already make when deciding other matters of self-defense.
Indeed, the general principles of self-defense in the common
law are tightly bound to questions of reasonableness.214 The
introduction of another reasonableness inquiry would not
overly complicate the analysis that juries already undertake
whenever they are confronted with a case of self-defense.
While reasonableness inquiries are prevalent in selfdefense cases, such inquiries are not universally acclaimed,
particularly as they relate to race and the law. As Cynthia Lee
writes, “racial stereotypes[] may influence our assessment of
whether the defendant’s use of force against the victim was
reasonable.”215 Professor Lee and others point to the Bernhard

neighborhood watch members and other similarly situated individuals would fall into
this latter category of those who deserve protection but are not squarely covered by
existing law.
211
People v. Goetz, 497 N.E.2d 41, 52 (N.Y. 1986).
212
DIST. JUDGES ASS’N 6TH CIR., PATTERN CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS
§ 6.06 (June 10, 2011), available at http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/internet/crim_
jury_insts/pdf/12_Chapter_6.pdf.
213
See 2 CRIMINAL PRACTICE MANUAL § 38:7 (2012).
214
See, e.g., Benjamin v. Bailey, 662 A.2d 1226, 1232 (Conn. 1995) (“The
common law principle permitting one to use deadly force in self-defense has long been
restricted by the general rule of reason.”).
215
Cynthia Kwei Yung Lee, Race and Self-Defense: Toward a Normative
Conception of Reasonableness, 81 MINN. L. REV. 367, 401 (1996).
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Goetz case, where the jury acquitted Goetz, who is white, for
shooting four black teens on a New York subway where Goetz
claimed he acted in self-defense.216 To combat this implicit racial
bias, “Lee has suggested that jurors determining reasonableness
claims in self-defense and provocation cases should be instructed
to conduct switching exercises,” in which they see whether they
would reach the same result if the races of the different parties
involved were switched.217 Yet, although juries’ determinations
of reasonableness are often criticized, even critics contend that
a reasonableness inquiry is better than most of the
alternatives.218 In other words, while the application of a
reasonableness standard is subject to question, the standard
itself remains sound.
Fundamentally, when properly applied, reasonableness
as the baseline inquiry on provocation dovetails closely with
the goal that a jury’s determinations should implement
society’s “collective sense of justice.”219 The very nature of the
reasonableness inquiry is that it seeks to determine whether
an individual’s conduct falls within the realm of socially
acceptable and societally expected behavior. Behavior that falls
outside of the sphere of reasonableness exposes the actor to
criminal or civil liability, or both.220 It is entirely appropriate
that a jury seeking to determine whether to extend the
protection of the criminal law to a defendant should make the
same determination in self-defense cases where there is an
issue of provocation.
IV.

APPLICATION OF REASONABLE PROVOCATION

To more fully develop and explain the use of a
reasonableness standard for determining questions of
provocation in self-defense cases, it will be helpful to examine how
the proposed rule will apply in real-world situations and how it
will interact with the existing frames of provocation. Such
determinations necessarily require highly fact-specific inquiries
that are best undertaken through the judicial process. This note
does not seek to answer the question of whether a jury would find
216

Id. at 420-21 (“Yet, whether the jurors were conscious of it or not, race
probably influenced the jury’s perception of whether Goetz acted reasonably.”).
217
Alafair S. Burke, Prosecutors and Peremptories, 97 IOWA L. REV. 1467,
1484 (2012).
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See Lee, supra note 215, at 374.
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Robinson, supra note 5, at 1.
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the specific actions discussed below reasonable. Rather, it seeks to
highlight some of the key factors that a jury should take into
account when making a reasonableness determination.
A.

George Zimmerman

George Zimmerman’s behavior on the night he shot
Trayvon Martin provides an initial test case for the standard of
reasonableness in self-defense provocation questions. Was
Zimmerman a vigilante or merely being vigilant? As discussed
above, Zimmerman, according to his own account of the events,
would likely not be able to claim self-defense under the Any
Provocation frame, but likely could claim self-defense under the
Straight Provocation or Provocation with Intent frames.221 This
divergence can be reconciled with a focus on reasonableness.
Under the Reasonable Provocation frame, the initial
inquiry in Zimmerman’s case under the proposed standard is
whether he behaved reasonably in following a suspicious
individual through his neighborhood because he thought the
individual might be preparing to commit a crime.222 While this
is perhaps not behavior in which the average person would
engage, a jury would not necessarily find that the behavior rose
to the level of unreasonableness. Indeed, Zimmerman would
argue that he fulfilled the role of a neighborhood watch
member. That he was more aggressive in that role than others
may not automatically elevate his conduct to the level of
unreasonableness. When weighing the reasonableness of
Zimmerman’s actions, a jury would likely take note that,
according to Zimmerman, when the 911 operator told him that
he did not have to follow Martin, he ceased to do so and began
walking back to his car.223 Following the instructions of the 911
operator would likely be seen as increasing the reasonableness
of Zimmerman’s actions. Zimmerman broke no laws, however,
and a jury could find that he intended to perform a useful task
for law enforcement officers.
Conversely, that Zimmerman carried a gun would likely
undermine the overall reasonableness of his actions in the eyes

221

See supra Part II.B.1.
Although the initial inquiry would have to be into the facts of the events
that night, this note assumes that Zimmerman’s account of events is true. Therefore
the inquiry for our purposes begins with a determination of facial reasonableness.
223
New Video, supra note 13.
222
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of a jury.224 But that alone does not require that Zimmerman’s
actions, given the totality of circumstances, be deemed
unreasonable. This is particularly true given that the question
here focuses on whether the behavior leading to and possibly
provoking the encounter was reasonable. Zimmerman’s
decision to carry a firearm did not directly lead to the
altercation, because there is no indication in Zimmerman’s
recounting of events that Martin even knew Zimmerman was
carrying a gun before the fight started.225 The discovery of the
gun after the altercation began cannot be thought to have
provoked that very altercation. A jury would have to decide
whether the act of carrying a loaded gun that night meant that
Zimmerman acted in a facially unreasonable manner.
Even if Zimmerman’s actions were facially unreasonable
that night, the fact finder’s inquiry is not at an end. Instead,
the jury would have to determine whether the risk of violence
that the defendant ran was reasonable in light of the totality of
circumstances. The issue then becomes a balancing test. On the
one hand is the foreseeable possibility of a violent
confrontation. On the other hand is the possible benefit of
locating and identifying a suspected burglar for the police. In
addition, there is the general deterrent effect of an engaged
and vigilant community.226 In light of these options, a jury
would need to determine whether the possible benefit of
Zimmerman’s actions outweighed the possible harms. Only if
the jury found Zimmerman’s actions reasonable in light of the
totality of circumstances would his self-defense claim succeed.
B.

Phoenix Jones

A more difficult analysis is required in the case of
Phoenix Jones—the Seattle “superhero.” On their face, Jones’s
actions in wearing a mask while actively seeking out crime to
fight seem likely to be found unreasonable under the proposed
224

Robertson & Schwartz, supra note 95 (“Using a gun in the neighborhood
watch role would be out of the question, [Sanford Police Department Volunteer
Coordinator Wendy Dorival] said in an interview.”).
225
Alvarez & Williams, supra note 6 (“Mr. Zimmerman was firm in his central selfdefense claim: He did not show his gun before the fight and he did not provoke Mr. Martin.”).
226
This is the general motivation behind such policing philosophies as the
“Broken Windows” theory. Maria Cruz Melendez, Moving to Opportunity & Mending
Broken Windows, 32 J. LEGIS. 238, 239 (2006) (“The Broken Windows theory suggests
that unchecked physical and social disorder within neighborhoods may lead to serious
crime within the neighborhood. Conversely, decreasing disorder within a neighborhood
may lead to a decrease in serious crimes.”).
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Reasonable Provocation frame. His actions smack of the
vigilantism that society refuses to protect as legitimate
behavior.227 While he may not fit the traditional vigilante mold
of one seeking to avenge crimes where traditional law
enforcement has failed, Jones walks perilously close to that
line. The line becomes even fuzzier when considering that Jones
carries weapons with him—though not firearms—while
intentionally seeking out situations replete with the possibility
of violence. That he wears a mask and styles himself a
superhero is not dispositive, but it certainly offers strong
support for the conclusion that Jones does not engage in
objectively facially reasonable behavior on his nighttime patrols
of dangerous neighborhoods. For Jones to succeed on the first
prong of the Reasonable Provocation test, a jury would have to
find that his superhero persona and behavior were reasonable.
Despite the unlikeliness of this finding, the inquiry
would not end there. Even if a jury found that Jones’s
superhero affectations were unreasonable, he may still fall
within the realm of self-defense protections. Jones could still
claim self-defense if the risk of violence in a given situation was
reasonable in light of the totality of circumstances. This
analysis boils down to a case-by-case balancing test of the
interests involved. In each instance, a jury must weigh whether
the harm that Jones aimed to prevent outweighed any
unreasonableness of his actions in working to prevent that
harm. In other words, even if he acted unreasonably, did
society benefit from Jones’s willingness to do so? This analysis
may mirror the approach that juries unofficially already take
when faced with cases of vigilantism. As Professor Hine writes,
“[T]he law of extra-judicial self-help is effectively split between
the ‘no justified vigilantism’ stance of the courts and the
‘justified if reasonable’ stance of the community.”228 This should
not be read to indicate that the rule proposed in this note is a
justification for vigilantism. Indeed, the author presumes that
a jury would find vigilantism in its more virulent forms
unreasonable. Rather, it indicates that a jury may find a place
for the sort of soft vigilantism of Phoenix Jones and other “reallife superheroes” as they patrol and seek to preempt violent
227

Kelly D. Hine, Vigilantism Revisited: An Economic Analysis of the Law of
Extra-Judicial Self-Help or Why Can’t Dick Shoot Henry for Stealing Jane’s Truck?, 47
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2013]

REASONABLE PROVOCATION

1695

confrontations. The evaluation of costs and benefits in any given
case would hinge on how unreasonable a jury found a particular
act balanced against the societal benefits it produced.
C.

Other Cases

While the determination of reasonableness must
ultimately be made by a court in full command of the facts,
under the prosecution’s version of events in the Dessin case,229 it
is hard to imagine a jury finding Dessin’s actions reasonable.
According to the prosecutor, Dessin sought out his victim for
the purpose of provoking a fight that would enable him to shoot
the victim and claim self-defense.230 It was essentially a
premeditated attack that—barring exceptional circumstances not
yet presented—a jury would almost certainly deem unreasonable
under either prong of the test. The determinations in the
Newcomer and Lowman cases, however, present more complexity.
In the case of Newcomer,231 the reasonableness
determination would depend on the facts that were known or
believed at the time Newcomer stopped his car to confront
Wintermyer. How violent was their earlier argument? Is there
any history of violence between the two? Did Newcomer
reasonably believe that violence would result if Wintermyer
continued to follow him? What did Newcomer intend to do when
he got out of his car? The answer to each of these questions would
inform a jury on the ultimate reasonableness of Newcomer’s
actions. It is clear that Newcomer apparently believed that
Wintermyer carried a weapon with him.232 The fact that
Newcomer shot him indicates that he perceived Wintermyer to be
a threat. These facts would cut against the reasonableness of
confronting Wintermyer. Certainly, confronting an armed and
threatening individual seems like an unreasonable course of
action to follow—more so when retreat seemed to be a perfectly
viable option in the form of simply continuing to drive. Yet
answering some of the questions above could also inform the
totality of circumstances prong and indicate that Newcomer’s
actions were reasonable when considering the full picture.
Focusing on the reasonableness of Newcomer’s acts would provide
229
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a focal point for the jury’s inquiry into whether Newcomer acted
in self-defense or whether he had removed himself from the law’s
protection by provoking the incident.
As in the case of Newcomer, the Lowman case233 would also
turn on the specific facts of the encounter. It appears that the
Lowmans knew the victim and had invited him into their home
before the incident. What they understood of the man’s personality
and mental state, plus their relation to him, would inform the
reasonableness of trying to confront him when he began hitting the
car with a metal pipe. As with Newcomer, the action does not
appear to be particularly reasonable on its face. The attacker was
in the process of smashing the Lowmans’ car with a metal pipe
when Roy Lowman approached him.234 This apparently followed an
argument between the Lowmans and the man.235 Lowman could
have remained in his home and simply called the police. But
instead, he left his home to confront the victim. Inserting himself
into that situation to protect property seems unreasonable, though
a jury could potentially find differently on that point alone.
Further, additional facts about the Lowmans’ relationship with the
man, their knowledge of his mental state, the manner in which
Lowman approached, and what Lowman said would all inform the
jury’s determination in such a case. When viewed in the totality of
circumstances, even an apparently reckless act could be
reasonable. It is through such a reasonableness inquiry that a jury
would be able to best determine the extent to which Mr. Lowman’s
actions ought to be protected by the law of self-defense. Regardless
of the actual outcome in any given case, focusing the jury’s inquiry
on the reasonableness of the defendant’s allegedly provocative
actions given the totality of circumstances provides the best course
for implementing society’s “collective sense of justice.”236
D.

Reasonableness as a Gloss on the Existing Frames

This note proposes that jurisdictions ought to adopt the
Reasonable Provocation frame for determining matters of
provocation. But even if not adopted as a stand-alone rule, the
reasonableness standard can serve as a helpful gloss on the
existing frames for determining provocation. Doing so would

233
234
235
236
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help to minimize the weaknesses intrinsic in each approach
and create a stronger, more just application of each frame.
Focusing on reasonableness under the Any Provocation
frame would soften an otherwise strict rule regarding the
defendant’s actions. Under the existing formulation, “[a]ny
form of conduct by the accused from which the fact finder may
reasonably infer that the accused contributed to the affray
constitutes ‘fault.’”237 The revised frame would require proof of
unreasonable conduct before a jury could find provocation. This
presents an inherently fairer framing of the issue. It does not
go so far as to require culpability—as might be required under
other frames—and offers some measure of protection for
nonculpable actors behaving within society’s norms and
expectations. An actor need no longer be completely blameless,
just reasonably blameless. This offers the jury a degree of latitude
in determining when to withdraw the legal protections of a selfdefense claim and allows the jury to reach the most just result.
Under
the
Straight
Provocation
frame,
the
reasonableness inquiry will aid juries in determining what
exactly it means to be the aggressor within the meaning of the
law. That is to say, behavior that could be described as
provocative—which could include anything from firing a gun238
to using profanity239—does not necessarily count as provocation
unless it is also unreasonable given the totality of
circumstances. Only then does the actor’s behavior constitute
provocation within the meaning of the law. In some sense, this
could be seen as merely substituting one ambiguous word
(“reasonable”) for another (“provocative”). But jurors in selfdefense cases are already steeped in determining issues of
reasonableness.240 The addition of another reasonableness
inquiry will introduce less confusion into the jury’s
deliberations than the need to make determinations under an
entirely different standard.
The interaction between the reasonableness standard and
the Provocation with Intent frame is the inverse of the
reasonableness standard’s interaction with the Straight
Provocation frame. With Straight Provocation, reasonableness
informs the determination of provocation. Under Provocation with
237
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Intent, the frame informs reasonableness. An individual acting
with the intent of provoking an incident to cause death or serious
bodily injury is not acting reasonably. Thus, his behavior would
not fall under the protection of the law. This is an instance in
which the frame would help to define reasonableness instead of
reasonableness helping to define the frame. The two standards
are not necessarily incompatible, though determinations of
unreasonableness may be broader than the extremely narrow
focus of the Provocation with Intent frame. Put differently,
conduct that constitutes Provocation with Intent will always be
presumed unreasonable, but unreasonable behavior may not fall
within the Provocation with Intent frame.
CONCLUSION
The law of self-defense is far from clear in situations
where an individual may have provoked an altercation by
deliberately inserting himself into a situation where violence is
likely. Different jurisdictions frame the issue of provocation
differently, so that conduct clearly deemed provocation in one
jurisdiction would just as clearly be protected as self-defense in
another. Yet all of the frames suffer from serious weaknesses.
To create a clear and fair rule of provocation, jurisdictions
should adopt a standard of reasonableness when weighing
questions of provocation. Under that standard, a defendant’s
self-defense claim would first be analyzed for facial
reasonableness. This analysis would create a presumption that
could be rebutted or affirmed by considering the totality of
circumstances. A defendant would be precluded from claiming
self-defense where his actions were found unreasonable under
this two-pronged inquiry. Either as a stand-alone rule or as a
gloss on the currently existing frames, this standard would
preserve societal notions of justice while providing a measure
of clarity to jurors and members of society at large.
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